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Abstract: This paper is a response to Park Seungbae’s article, “Defence of Cultural 
Relativism”. Some of the typical criticisms of moral relativism are the following: 
moral relativism is erroneously committed to the principle of tolerance, which is a 
universal principle; there are a number of objective moral rules; a moral relativist 
must admit that Hitler was right, which is absurd; a moral relativist must deny, in the 
face of evidence, that moral progress is possible; and, since every individual belongs 
to multiple cultures at once, the concept of moral relativism is vague. Park argues 
that such contentions do not affect moral relativism and that the moral relativist 
may respond that the value of tolerance, Hitler’s actions, and the concept of culture 
are themselves relative. In what follows, I show that Park’s adroit strategy is unsuc-
cessful. Consequently, moral relativism is incoherent. 
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THE INCOHERENCE OF MORAL RELATIVISM 
 
Moral relativism is a meta-ethical theory according to which moral values 
and duties are relative to a culture and do not exist independently of a 
culture. Rather, each culture establishes its own values and duties, and 
therefore there is no ultimate, objective right or wrong. In Saudi Arabia 
polygamy is accepted, in the US it isn’t. In India it is immoral to kill a  
cow, in Italy it isn’t. Who is correct, the Saudi Arabians or the  Ameri-
cans, the Indians or the Italians? According to cultural relativism, since 
there is no ultimate standard of morality, neither culture is correct. It 
follows that it is not possible to say that one culture is morally superior 
to another. Thus, any act can be both right and wrong. For example, rel-
ative to a liberal culture, slavery is wrong; but relative to a non-liberal 
culture, slavery may be right. Again, which of the two cultures is correct? 
Neither is, according to a moral relativist. Consequently, slavery can both 
be right and wrong because it depends on the particular point of view of 
a particular culture. In addition, cultural relativism claims that we have to 
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tolerate other cultures. That is to say, since no ultimate standard of mo-
rality exists, the moral relativist must not judge, but rather tolerate, other 
cultures. Furthermore, cultural relativism argues that moral progress does 
not occur in the sense that a moral change, say, from slavery to equality, 
implies moving toward an ultimate moral standard. Rather, change can 
happen within a culture, but it does not follow that there are ultimate, 
culture-independent standards of morality at which a culture aims or 
ought to aim1.  
One clarification is necessary from the outset. Park specifically uses 
the term cultural relativism to refer to moral relativism. This is certainly 
not an issue. Perhaps, his choice of terminology is to emphasize that mo-
rality is merely a cultural phenomenon. However, for the sake of clarity, 
by cultural, as opposed to moral, relativism it is typically intended no 
more than the notion that different cultures have different beliefs and 
practices. This view derives from the work of anthropologists such as 
William Sumner, Ruth Benedict, and Meville Herskovits. Cultural rela-
tivism is not the object of contention here. Cultural relativism differs 
from moral relativism, according to which moral judgment, value, and 
duties are culturally relative. In this paper, I use the term moral relativism 
instead of cultural relativism.  
Also, it has to be noted that Park’s rebuttal to the criticisms against 
moral relativism is based on Gilbert Harman’s analogy between morality 
and Einstein’s theory of relativity (Park, 2011: 160) Specifically, motion is 
not absolute but relative to a particular reference frame. A train travels at 
100 m/h with respect to the ground. A passenger onboard is also travel-
ling at the same speed. However, relative to the passenger, she may be 
sitting comfortably reading a newspaper, motionless, or walking to the 
bathroom at 2 m/h. Moreover, if we consider their speed relative to 
Earth orbiting around the sun, the train and the passenger are moving at 
the speed of 67,000 m/h. Relative to our solar system, they are moving 
around the center of our galaxy at approximately 490,000 m/h. Which is 
the correct speed? “Wrong question!” says the moral relativist. The right 
question is, “Relative to whom?” It would be arbitrary to say that one 
particular frame of reference is correct. Park argues that moral values are, 
like motion, relative to a particular frame of reference, which is the cul-
ture that does the valuing; and it would be arbitrary to say that one moral 
framework is better than or superior to another. In the following, I re-
spond to Park’s rebuttals to various criticisms of moral relativism. As I 
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will show, Park’s arguments do not succeed in defending moral relativ-
ism from the charge of incoherence.  
 
PRINCIPLE OF TOLERANCE 
 
A frequently touted principle of moral relativism is tolerance. The prin-
ciple of tolerance simply states that it is a virtue of moral relativism to 
tolerate other cultures. Since no culture is ultimately right or wrong, the 
moral relativist acknowledges that his or her opinion about morality is 
neither superior nor inferior to the opinion of others. Consequently, it 
would seem that moral relativism endorses the principle of tolerance. 
Opponents of moral relativism point out that the very principle of toler-
ance undermines, rather than supports, moral relativism. That is, if a 
universal principle of tolerance should be upheld by moral relativists, 
then such a principle would have to be culturally independent – the pos-
sibility of which moral relativism denies. To be consistent, a moral rela-
tivist must argue that the principle of tolerance is not a universal prin-
ciple, but rather a relative one. It has to be noted that Rachels (2010: 18), 
Stace (1975: 58), and others argue that the principle of tolerance is es-
sential to moral relativism. In my view, and others (Wreen, 2001: 331) 
moral relativism need not logically imply the endorsement of the prin-
ciple of tolerance. At any rate, Park accommodates tolerance by arguing,  
The principle of tolerance is also relative to a culture, so a tolerant act is moral in 
reference to a culture which agrees with it but is immoral in reference to another 
which disagrees with it…Thus, the cultural relativist does not have to require that 
the principle of tolerance be absolute. (Park, 2011: 161) 
Granted, the moral relativist need not endorse tolerance as an objective 
principle. However, while this strategy seems to remove an internal in-
consistency, it generates other problems. To say that the principle of to-
lerance is also relative to a culture amounts to saying nothing more than 
there is no tolerance, except to the extent that the individual decides to 
tolerate others. As we will see, in a later section that discusses the ques-
tion of what exactly is a culture, Park states that any number of people 
can be a culture (Park, 2011: 164). Since Park concedes that an individual 
can be part of many different cultures, it follows that such relativistic to-
lerance boils down to some form of moral subjectivism. Subjectivism 
can encompass several views: that ethical statements are expressions of 
sentiments or personal preferences; or the view of Protagoras that “man 
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is the measure of all things,” which can be intended as a form of egoism. 
Park here does not argue for moral subjectivism. However, the assertion 
that tolerance is also relative, in connection with the acknowledgement 
that each individual belongs to many different cultures, leads to this con-
clusion.  
The fundamental problem with subjectivism – which also applies to 
relativism – is that subjectivism is self-refuting. If the subjectivist’s asser-
tion of relativism is correct, the subjectivist must allow the assertion of 
subjectivism itself to be absolutely true. Suppose Park responds that 
subjectivism is true absolutely and all beliefs except subjectivism are true 
only relatively to the individual. This retreat does not save subjectivism. 
Aside from being ad hoc, once the subjectivist allows for the absolute 
truth in asserting subjectivism, it may well follow that there could be any 
other absolute truths besides relativism; and if there are, then subjectiv-
ism itself is absolutely false, because it denies that there are absolute 
truths except itself. Thus, either the moral relativist accepts tolerance as 
an objective principle, which undermines moral relativism, or he argues 
that tolerance is relative, but this leads to moral subjectivism, which is 
self-refuting. 
 
UNIVERSAL MORAL RULES 
 
Park notes that moral philosophers of all creeds agree that cultural rela-
tivism denies the existence of, as Park puts is, “universal” moral rules. 
Firstly, Park’s terminology is somewhat infelicitous. The term “univer-
sal” is a bit confusing. I prefer to use the term “objective.” Paying the 
subway fare is a universal rule, but it is not an objective rule. A rule is 
objective just if it transcends those who acknowledge it. In other words, 
objective moral values are values that exist independently of humans, 
while universal values can be values that humans choose to endorse un-
iversally. The fact that they are universal implies no ontological com-
mitment in the sense that a rule or a moral principle can be accepted by 
all members of a culture or by members of different cultures. However, 
their acceptance does not stem from the existence of human-indepen-
dent values. Thus, the rule, “No smoking allowed” can be universal, 
meaning that all people must abide by that rule. However, it is not an 
objective rule that exists independently of humans.  
Referring to the writings of Thomson, and Schick and Vaughn, Park 
points out that these authors believe in universal moral principles, such as 
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“One ought not to torture babies to death for fun.” “Equals should be 
treated equally.” and “Unnecessary suffering is wrong.” (Park, 2011: 161) 
Park then argues that the existence of universal moral rules does not 
undermine moral relativism because it is possible that universal moral 
rules exist insofar as they are rules shared by many cultures. According to 
Park, it is even possible that all cultures in the world shared the same 
moral values, but such unanimity would not stem from the existence of 
absolute moral values.  
For the cultural relativist, a moral rule is universal not because it is in line with 
the absolutely right standard that transcends all cultures but because it is in line 
with all the cultures in the world. Cultural relativism does not have to preclude 
the possibility that all the cultures in the world jointly endorse some moral rules. 
(Park, 2011: 161) 
The point, however, is not whether different cultures can have common 
moral values by convention. That’s evidently true. The question is about 
the ontological status of such values. Clearly, Park acknowledges the 
possibility that all the world cultures might jointly endorse the same 
moral values. However, he states that such unanimity would be purely 
relative. “Cultural relativism” he writes, “does not have to preclude the 
possibility that all the cultures in the world jointly endorse some moral 
rules.” (Park, 2011: 162) But how does he propose to explain that all 
cultures in the world endorse the same moral rules? Indeed, virtually all 
cultures in the world, despite their respective beliefs, approve of moral 
principles such as “unnecessary suffering is wrong or torturing babies for 
fun is immoral.” What is the best explanation for such unanimous 
agreement? If such agreement exists, it is, I argue, either due to chance, 
convention, or to necessity. It seems unlikely that it is due to chance. It 
could be due to convention; but on what is the convention based? Vir-
tually all cultures in the world hold that torturing innocent babies for fun 
is immoral. If it were due to convention, any one culture could readily 
hold the opposite view on whether torturing babies for fun is moral, and 
thus the moral relativist would have an argument. But that is not the 
case. In fact, all culture categorically recognizes that torturing innocent 
babies for fun is immoral independently of what anyone thinks or be-
lieves. Consequently, it seems plausible that at least some values, such as 
torturing babies for fun is immoral, are valid independently of what 
people think, believe, or decide. What follows, then, is that certain moral 
values are really objective.  
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People disapprove of torturing babies for fun because it is wrong – 
but torturing babies for fun is not wrong because people disapprove of 
it. Our moral experience that certain acts are really, objectively wrong 
and others objectively right is confirmed by the cross-cultural moral 
agreement about such right or wrong acts. It is not sufficient for the re-
lativist to say that moral agreement might be due to just pure chance or 
convention. In order to demonstrate that, after all, these agreed upon 
moral principles are relative and that our moral experience of objective 
moral values is illusory, one would be required to present some compel-
ling evidence to show that by pure chance all cultures approve or disap-
prove of the same principles. Such argument would have to show that 
our moral experience of objective moral value is unreliable. However, 
such argument would be based on premises that are less obvious and 
more controversial than the existence of objective moral values them-
selves. In the absence of a compelling argument that might show other-
wise, the most plausible explanation to the fact that all people, excluding 
the sadist and the deranged, agree with the same moral principles is that 
such principles are independent of people’s opinions. Thus, it is a ra-
tional position to hold that objective moral values and duties exist. No 
sensible person would ever hold that unnecessary suffering is morally 
good or permissible. To say that these deep-seated moral convictions 
are, in the end, relative just flies in the face of reason and in the face of 
our moral experience.  
 
WAS HITLER RIGHT? 
 
According to Park the answer can be yes and no. To be consistent, a 
moral relativist must hold that, since moral values and duties are 
culturally relative, there is no moral difference between Hitler’s genocidal 
actions and, say, the actions of missionaries helping African children 
orphaned by the AIDS epidemic. Contra moral relativism, our common 
sense tells us that it is absurd to think that Hitler’s misdeeds are morally 
equivalent to the loving acts of missionaries. Park bites the bullet: “…a 
cultural relativist would stand his ground, saying that Hitler’s acts were 
moral with respect to the Nazi culture, and Mother Teresa’s acts were 
moral with respect to non-Nazi culture.” (Park, 2011: 162) According to 
Park, it is natural that Hitler’s acts are immoral to us because our moral 
frame of reference is influenced by non-Nazi principles. At the same 
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time, “Members of the Nazi culture would reject our judgment because 
their intuition is predisposed to favor their own culture, and they are 
unconsciously using it in appraising non-Nazi culture.” (Park, 2011: 162) 
Furthermore, according to Park  
[I]f Hitler had been a cultural relativist, he would not have attacked Jews in the 
first place because he would have believed that the German culture was no more 
correct than the Jewish culture. Moreover, his atrocious actions conform well to a 
cultural absolutist’s possible belief that the German culture was superior to the 
Jewish culture. It is not clear to me whether it is cultural relativism or absolutism 
that has more dangerous implications on our daily lives. (Park, 2011: 162) 
To be precise, not all members of the Nazi party supported their own 
culture. There are numerous stories of members of the Nazi party, like 
Oskar Schindler, who saved the lives of thousands of Jews, or soldiers 
refusing to kill Jews (see Anderson, 2014, and Kitterman, 1988). Again, 
what is the best explanation of members of the Nazi culture refusing to 
allow injustice to be committed against innocent people? The most 
plausible explanation seems to be that those Nazi individuals who op-
posed Nazi morality felt that Hitler’s agenda was objectively monstrous 
and unjust, and thus objectively immoral. Indeed, it is precisely because 
these individuals were not moral relativists that they saved Jews. Had 
they espoused moral relativism, they would have agreed with their own 
cultural morality and allowed Hitler’s atrocities to be carried out – espe-
cially if we consider, as Park suggests, that tolerance is relative. On the 
contrary, those individuals recognized that what Hitler was doing was re-
ally, objectively wrong. 
As Dónal P. O’Mathúna notes, during the Nazi era in Germany, as a 
result of Darwin’s evolutionary theory, the notion of “social Darwinism” 
and “survival of the fittest” was applied to human beings (O’Mathúna 3) 
Darwin’s theory showed that human beings were not specially created. 
Rather, they are animals that slowly evolved from an ape-like creature 
that existed several million years ago – that in its turn descended from a 
simple marine organism. Darwin’s theory, unfortunately, was enthusiasti-
cally adopted by the wealthy to justify capitalism as the best economic 
model because it is an exemplification of survival of the fittest. 
Furthermore, the eugenics movement started by Darwin’s cousin, Francis 
Galton (1822-1911), was readily taken up and distorted into notions of 
racial superiority and racial hygiene by the Nazis. Moreover, Hitler was 
so fascinated by the writings of Nietzsche that he gifted Mussolini with 
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the complete works of Nietzsche’s ideas of anti-egalitarianism, the war-
rior, the Superman, nihilism, and the will to power inspired Hitler to act 
the way he did. Did Hitler sorely misunderstand Nietzsche? In my view 
he did. But this is not the time or the place to have such a discussion. 
The point is that Hitler committed his misdeeds on the basis of his rela-
tivistic worldview. Thus, contrary to Park’s assertion, had Hitler been a 
moral objectivist, he would have recognized that genocide is morally 
wrong. 
At all events, most sensible people would not say that Hitler was 
moral based on his frame of reference; rather, most people say that 
Hitler did what he did because he was a megalomaniac and or mentally 
deranged sadist (Coolidge, Davis, and Segal, 2007: 3). But isn’t what I am 
saying just an arbitrary judgment showing that morality is relative? I 
think not because those of us who think that Hitler acted immorally, be-
sides having a moral experience to the effect that Hitler’s acts were really 
immoral independently of what anyone might think, we also have good 
rational arguments independent of personal preference that can serve to 
show that Hitler was objectively wrong. If there were no objective moral 
values, moral statements could not be true. Then, arguing logically about 
morality would be impossible. Consider this argument:  
1.  Murder is the unlawful and malicious act of killing a human being.  
2.  Unlawful and malicious acts of killing a human being are morally 
wrong.  
3.  It follows that murder is morally wrong.  
4.  Hitler committed murder. 
5.  Therefore, Hitler is morally wrong. 
This is a deductively valid and sound moral argument. The argument is 
sound independently of whether I or the moral relativist believes so. 
Given the premises, the conclusion follows by logical necessity, and thus 
the argument is formally valid. And since the argument is valid, and the 
premises are true, it is also sound. However, moral relativists cannot 
accept this because they argue (at least Park does) that a moral claim can 
both be true and false. But a statement cannot be both true and false 
without violating the law of non-contradiction.  
The analogy with motion is not relevant here. Presumably, Park would 
point out that since morality, like motion, is relative to the observer, 
there is no one interpretation that is right or wrong. However, in the 
preceding argument, each premise is either true or false independently of 
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which framework one uses. One could try to deny the intermediate 
conclusion 3., but this would be highly controversial as 3. follows 
from 2., which is virtually universally accepted, and thus hard to deny. 
Consequently, if relativism is true, then moral argumentation is not a 
possibility; but logical moral argumentation is possible, as the example 
above illustrates. This is obvious by the fact that one can present sound 
or cogent arguments in support or against certain moral facts. It is the 
very power of sound and cogent argumentation that provides moral jus-
tification. It follows that moral statements can be true, and they are be-
cause they refer to objective standards of right and wrong. Consequently, 
Hitler’s acts were immoral – objectively immoral. 
 
ON THE POSSIBILITY OF MORAL PROGRESS 
 
According to moral relativism, there are no absolutely right standards or 
absolutely wrong standards of morality. Considering my culture at present 
as an example, in the US most people regard slavery as a barbaric and 
immoral practice of the past, while they value freedom and equality. 
However, according to Park there is no moral difference between our 
past and present culture. In other words, it cannot be said that as a cul-
ture we’ve made moral progress. But isn’t it obvious that morally speak-
ing we are better off today than we were prior to the abolition of slavery? 
Isn’t women’s suffrage a clear example of moral progress? According to 
Park, the answer to both questions is “No.” He writes, 
A cultural relativist would admit that we moved toward equality as a 
result of the abolition of slavery, but he would deny that we moved 
toward the absolutely right standard. We may think that we are now 
closer to the absolutely right standard because equality is of absolute 
value. When we think so, however, we are using the present culture as 
our moral frame of reference which approves of equality. If we use the 
past culture as our moral frame of reference which disapproved of 
equality, we would have an opposite intuition that we are now farther 
from the absolutely right standard, and hence we made moral regress 
rather than progress (Park, 2011: 163). 
There are a few problems with the above argument. Firstly, what 
exactly are “the past culture” and “the present culture”? Are we not 
talking about the same culture? And when does the old culture end and 
the new culture begin? It is more plausible to say that it is the same 
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culture evolving morally. Secondly, if we take slavery as an example, it is 
obvious that many people who were part of the American culture in the 
past opposed slavery and thought that slavery was morally bankrupt 
from the start. How can a moral relativist explain these facts other than 
with the notion of moral progress? As Michael Huemer aptly puts it, 
“skeptics cannot explain the pervasive trend toward liberalization of 
values over human history, and that the best explanation is the realist’s: 
humanity is becoming increasingly liberal because liberalism is the 
objectively correct moral stance.” (Huemer, 2016: 1)  
Furthermore, I want to offer two arguments to show that moral 
progress occurs. According to Dale Jamieson, change does not necessar-
ily indicate progress. In fact, something can change for the worse. It can 
only be called progress when an ensuing state is generally better than the 
original one (Jamieson, 2002: 318). But the question is, “Better in what 
respect?” Here I propose a very simple thought experiment. If today’s 
equality and democracy were neither better nor worse than yesterday’s 
slavery and dictatorship, then one would have no qualms living in the 
past. But no one would ever live in the past, that is, one would never 
trade equality and democracy for slavery and dictatorship. Therefore, 
today’s achievements, such as equality and democracy, are morally better 
than, and morally superior to, slavery and dictatorship. And since better 
implies progress, it follows that equality and democracy are examples of 
moral progress. In other words, equality and democracy are paradigms of 
morality toward which past cultures moved. 
My second argument is as follows: Social change may be due to tech-
nological, economic, aesthetic, or moral factors. If a change can be ex-
plained in terms other than moral factors, then such change is not due to 
moral progress. Abolition of slavery, for example, is not due to technol-
ogical, economic, or aesthetic, factors. Technological, economic, and 
aesthetic factors might be involved in slavery. But they are not the driv-
ing factors for abolition of slavery. Therefore, abolition of slavery is a 
moral change. A moral change implies that the current states of affairs 
are not good or are not as good as they could or ought to be and thus 
must be changed at least for the better, but possibly for the best; the 
“best”, I take it, is a state of affairs characterized by total equality. 
There are also a number of social changes. I want to classify such 
changes under four distinct headings, technological, economic, aesthetic, 
and moral. Examples of technological and economic changes are agri-
cultural advancements such as irrigation, the plow, cotton gin, and more, 
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which led to surplus food, population growth and urbanization. The 
process of moving from an agrarian-based economy, or even from a 
hunter-gatherer society, to an industrial or postindustrial economy can 
be explained in terms of improving productivity and consequently capi-
tal. The point is that there was nothing morally wrong about an agrarian-
based society.  
Similarly, in the past people used to wear hats as a protection against 
rain, dust, cold, and the sun. Due to several factors, including transpor-
tation, hygiene, and fashion, wearing a hat became less necessary and no 
longer fashionable. Once again, there is nothing morally wrong about 
wearing a hat. In fact, some people wish to return to a time when people 
wore elegant clothes instead of sagging pants and basketball shoes. At 
any rate, the change from a hatted society to a non-hatted one does not 
imply than one is morally better than the other. 
Now consider the abolition of slavery. Slavery was not abolished due 
to aesthetic factors, though one could argue that slavery creates a num-
ber of aesthetically negative externalities. But the reason slavery was 
abolished was due to slavery’s immorality. The change from slavery to 
equality cannot be explained other than in terms of moral improvement 
from a morally bad situation to a morally good one. And this gradation 
implies that there is a paradigm of goodness against which we measure 
moral facts. In other words, slavery is the unjust owning of a human be-
ing by another human being. Also, slavery caused the enslaved unneces-
sary suffering. No one – not even the moral relativist – would deny this 
much. Thus, if we moved from slavery to equality, the best explanation is 
that a world that contains slavery is morally inferior to a world that does 
not contain slavery. Or, equality is morally better than slavery. And to say 
that one is inferior and the other superior implies the existence of abso-
lute (objective) moral values. Unlike other social changes, the abolition 
of slavery implies that we have made moral progress toward a standard 
of morality that is objective. What’s more is that even moral relativists, 
though consistency to their moral view may compel them to deny it, rec-
ognize that equality is better than slavery.  
 
ANY ACT CAN BE MADE MORAL 
 
Moral relativism is internally inconsistent because it implies that any act 
can be made moral by forming a culture that accepts it. Park quotes 
Pojman saying, “[Ted] Bundy would be morally pure in raping and killing 
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innocents simply by virtue of forming a little coterie.” (qtd. in Park, 
2011: 164). But Park bites the bullet, again: “A cultural relativist would 
cheerfully grant that any act can be made moral by forming a culture that 
approves of it.” (Park, 2011: 164) Yet again, his defense relies on the 
analogy between morality and the relativity of motion:  
A car is traveling at 50km/h with respect to the ground. As long as you invoke a 
right frame of reference, the car can be said to be traveling at any speed you like. 
For example, it can be said to be moving at 30km/h, if you pick as a frame of 
reference a bicycle traveling at 20km/h with respect to the ground in the same 
direction. Regarding the same car, you can say that it is moving at 50km/h, 
30km/h, etc. You can choose whatever velocity you like. You are right about the 
velocity of the car, insofar as you appeal to a right frame of reference. The same 
is true of morality. You are right about the morality of a certain action inasmuch 
as you invoke a culture which commends it. For example, you can say that 
murder is right, but add that the action is assessed under the criminal culture 
which praises murder. (Park, 2011: 164) 
As I indicated earlier, in order to support moral relativism, the moral 
relativist must show that our moral experience is not reliable; and to 
accomplish such a task he must present arguments whose premises must 
be more controversial than the notion that certain moral principles are 
objectively true. Park resorts to the claim that any act can be moral so 
long as a culture approves of it. Suppose that a culture was formed by 
the like of Ted Bundy, Richard Ramirez, Joel Rifkin, Charles Manson, 
and others. It does not follow that murder would be moral because such 
a “culture” deems it so. But which moral frame of reference are we using 
to say that the culture formed by serial killers is wrong about murder? 
Couldn’t they say the same about us? Park implies that it depends on 
which frame of reference we use; or in other words, to say that one is 
more correct than another is purely arbitrary.  
But is it just an arbitrary call? Not at all. Granted, each culture might 
have its own opinion. However, we can show through rational argu-
mentation that the serial killers’ culture is morally wrong. We have com-
pelling reasons to condemn such a culture. On the other hand, the serial 
killers’ culture does not have any rational reason to justify their position. 
They might just say that they enjoy killing innocent people or that killing 
innocent people gives them pleasure. Thus, we are in a position to judge 
such a culture as an immoral culture. As Mary Midgley points out, moral 
isolationism, a view that can be expressed by the question, “Who are we 
Cultura. International Journal of Philosophy of Culture and Axiology 17(1)/2020: 19-38 
 
31 
to judge?” is logically incoherent. (Midgley, 2007) Firstly, if moral isola-
tionism were correct, then it would be possible to praise and respect a 
culture without judging it. However, judgment is logically antecedent to 
respect. One judges a culture in order to respect it. Secondly, we are able 
to judge our own culture and ourselves precisely because we compare 
other cultures, and use them as a frame of reference, to judge our own. 
If we may not judge other cultures, then how do we expect to judge our 
own? This would imply the inability to judge any moral act that is bla-
tantly absurd – such as a culture that deems murder and rape moral. 
Thirdly, cultures do not exist in a vacuum. Nowadays, cultures are com-
pletely intermixed. This means that by knowing other cultures, through 
our moral experience, and by the aid of sound reasoning, we are in a po-
sition to judge others and determine whether their acts are moral.  
Furthermore, as others have pointed out, the analogy between moral-
ity and motion upon which Park constantly relies is a false analogy 
(Cornea, 2012: 35). Firstly, Park does not provide any compelling reason 
as to why morality should be as relative as motion. Secondly, Park notes 
that a car’s velocity is relative. If we use the ground as a frame of refer-
ence the car is travelling at 50 km/h; if we instead use a bicycle traveling 
at 20km/h as a frame of reference, then the car is travelling at 30 km/h. 
Of course, we can say that the car is travelling at 50 km/h and at 
30 km/h and at many other speeds depending on the particular frame of 
reference used. However, imagine that a driver is travelling at 50 km/h on 
a road that has a limit of 40 km/h. It would be of no avail for the driver 
to try to get out of a speeding ticket by arguing that, with reference to a 
bicycle travelling at 20 km/h, he was travelling at 30 km/h – 10 km/h 
under the speed limit!  
The fact is that motion is relative. However, to say that motion is rela-
tive is merely emphasizing that motion is a mysterious notion. In other 
words, from our point of view it is relative. But it exists and our expe-
rience of motion is objective and has a meaning. Insofar as our expe-
rience of motion is meaningful, we don’t measure the speed of cars in 
reference to bicycles or the speed of airplanes in reference to birds for 
good reasons. If one suggested that since motion is relative from our 
point of view, it is futile to have speed limits or measure the speed of a 
marathon runner or that a train is travelling simultaneously at different 
speeds – because in the end it’s all relative – we would say that he is plain 
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wrong. If he protested and asked what makes a frame of reference more 
correct than another, we might simply reply that while our measurements 
might vary, the fact is that motion is real and independent of our mea-
surements. Furthermore, measuring speed the way a speed camera does 
is more sensible given our experience as humans. Similarly, with moral-
ity, we do not have to be lost in relativism because we can use reason 
and our moral experience of objective moral values and duties to deter-
mine that certain values are moral or immoral. We might measure mo-
rality differently, but it does not follow that moral values do not exist. 
Thus, just by asserting that any act can be made moral, it does not follow 
that any act can be moral. Moreover, it is false that no moral framework 
is more correct than another. For example, we have experiential and ra-
tional resources to show that the moral framework that values equality is 
superior to a moral framework that value slavery. 
 
MORAL RELATIVISM IS A VAGUE CONCEPT 
 
According to moral relativism morality is relative to a culture. However, 
what exactly is a culture? How many members constitute a culture? When 
we study different cultures, we learn that they are not uniform; rather, 
the people within the same culture have disparate views and, often, 
contradictory views. Since it is not clear how many people are required 
to count as a culture or a society, cultural relativism is vague. Park argues 
that this is not a serious problem.  
[A] cultural relativist could conjure up again the relativity of motion. We can 
group a tree, a road sign, and a rock together, and say that a car is traveling at 
50km/h in relation to that group of the objects. How many objects are required 
in order for the group to serve as a frame of reference? The answer is obvious. 
Any number of objects can do. Even million objects can constitute a single frame 
of reference. The same is true of morality. Any number of people can constitute a 
culture. (Park, 2011: 164) 
The moral relativist need not be committed to a specific number of indi-
viduals as the paradigm of a culture. However, there are a few problems 
with this philosophical stand. First of all, just because any number of 
people can constitute a culture, it does not follow that morality is relative 
to that culture. Thinking that something is the case does not make it the 
case. As we have seen in the previous discussion, a group of serial killers 
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could form a culture and endorse a value of killing people for fun. This 
however, in no way demonstrates that morality is relative. Again, here 
the analogy between morality and the relativity of motion does not really 
help. True, any number of objects could serve as a frame of reference to 
assert that a car is travelling at 50 km/h. However, the fact remains that 
there is a car travelling. In other words, following this analogy, the num-
ber of people that constitute a culture may vary, but moral values are still 
objective. At any rate, the main worry with Park’s characterization of 
cultural relativism is that it eventually collapses down into some form of 
moral subjectivism. Since Park does not explicitly endorse subjectivism, I 
will refrain from addressing it. However, if that were the case, subjectiv-
ism is notoriously incoherent.  
Furthermore, Park points out that the same criticism of the vagueness 
of moral relativism when it comes to the number of people needed to 
constitute a culture, applies to cultural absolutism: 
Recall that cultural absolutism says that there is the absolutely right standard 
transcending all “cultures.” Note that the concept of culture also figures in the 
formulation of cultural absolutism. A cultural absolutist is faced with a similar 
challenge: How large must a group be in order to constitute a culture that is 
transcended by the absolutely right culture transcends? (Park, 2011: 166) 
Aside from the fact that Park here commits the so-called “you too” 
fallacy, the concept of culture need not – in fact it does not – figure in 
the formulation of moral absolutism as Park asserts. Moral absolutism is 
the notion according to which there are moral principles by which all 
peoples’ actions may be judged. Kant’s deontology, for example, is a 
form of moral absolutism. But one can be a moral realist and argue that 
our experience informs us of objective moral values and duties. By ob-
jective, it may be pointed out, it is meant that such values and duties are 
independent or that they exist independently of the opinions and prefe-
rences of humans. Objective moral values exist whether we like it or not. 
In other words, the question of how many people are needed to consti-
tute a culture that is transcended by moral values is completely irrelevant 
because the moral absolutist or realist just claims that moral values exist, 
period. Conversely, it is the moral relativist the one postulating that mo-
rality is relative to a culture, and thus it is he – not the moral absolutist – 
who needs to deal with the question of what constitutes a culture. 
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BELONGING TO TWO CULTURES 
 
According to moral relativism, morality is culturally relative. But what is 
a culture? Most people belong to many cultures at once. For example, 
which moral values should a raw vegan, homosexual, Catholic, African-
born, American-naturalized, classical musician, heavy metal aficionado 
man endorse? He belongs to different cultures at the same time, which 
often advocate conflicting moral values. As Pojman points out, “Relativ-
ism would seem to tell us that where he is a member of societies with 
conflicting moralities he must be judged both wrong and not-wrong 
whatever he does. (Pojman, 2008: 18). Park attempts to explain away this 
paradox:  
Suppose, for example, that Mary is an American citizen and Christian, and that 
she had an abortion. The American law condones it, but Christianity prohibits 
it… A cultural relativist would again ask us to reflect upon the relativity of 
motion. Suppose that a car is in motion with respect to the ground. In such a 
situation, the driver is both in motion and at rest…The driver is in motion with 
respect to the ground but is at rest with respect to the passenger. The same is 
true of morality…Mary’s abortion is moral in relation to the American culture 
but is immoral in relation to the Christian culture. (Park, 2011: 165) 
However, the fact that “American law condones” Mary’s abortion does 
not mean that abortion is moral. The law, American or Brazilian, con-
dones many things that are morally questionable. The ground for “con-
doning” abortion in the US is the right to privacy. Specifically, the 14th 
Amendment prohibits states from depriving a person of liberty without 
due process. Thus, a woman has the right to end a pregnancy without 
undue interference from the government because the right to liberty 
comprises the right to make decisions about family and the right to bo-
dily integrity. On the other hand, although scriptures are not precise 
about abortion, Christians in general deem abortion as an immoral act. 
This, however, does not prove that moral relativism is true. And conse-
quently, it does not follow that one can be wrong and not wrong at the 
same time.  
The morality of abortion is too complicated an issue to explain here. 
Suffices to say that generally speaking moral disagreement over abortion 
is not due to the relativity of moral values, but rather the relativity of 
belief. That is, Christianity, for example, teaches that a fetus is a person; 
persons are inherently valuable because God made them; destroying the 
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life of a person is immoral; abortion destroys a fetus; therefore, abortion 
is immoral. Christianity, of course, allows for exceptions when abortion 
is performed to save the life of a woman. On the other hand, those who 
are for abortion either do not believe that a fetus is a person or, even if 
they do, they may argue that a fetus has no special intrinsic worth. How-
ever, It is hardly the case, for example, that different cultures disagree 
over whether “killing innocent people” is wrong (Simpson, 2001: 4).  
Park’s argument shows only that people have different opinions. The 
law permits abortion, Christianity deems it immoral. This is hardly a re-
velation. His argument, however, does not show that Mary is right and 
wrong at the same time. Two individuals may have different opinions on 
whether the Empire State Building is in Paducah or whether it is in New 
York City. But the objective fact is that it is in New York City. One is 
right the other is wrong. Similarly, it does not follow that abortion is 
moral and immoral at the same time. In fact, American legislators and 
Christians both agree that deliberately killing innocent people is objec-
tively wrong. Either a fetus is a person or not. If it turned out that it is, 
and the morality of abortion depends on this fact, the fact that different 
individuals have different beliefs about abortion does not make Mary 
right and wrong at the same time. In such a case, she would be wrong – 
objectively wrong.  
Again, here Park invokes the analogy of motion. The example of a car 
in motion is not helpful. A car is moving using the road as reference 
frame, though the driver is not using himself as a reference frame. 
However, it would be hard for the driver to deny that he is driving a car 
that is, in fact, moving. The fact is that motion is occurring. How we 
measure the speed of the car is not relevant here. The point is that from 
the reference frame of the driver the car is moving. From the point of 
view of a bystander the car is moving. From the point of view of a tree 
the car is moving. From the point of view of roadkill the car is moving. 
From the point of view of the universe the car is moving. If morality is 
like motion, it does not follow that it is relative. The way we measure 
motion is relative, but not that there is motion is a relative fact. By 
analogy, cultures measure moral acts differently, but it does not follow 
from this that there are no objective moral values.  
Now, Park asks, “Which culture should Mary choose when she con-
templates whether to have an abortion or not?” (Park, 2011: 165) The 
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one that is right, it may be answered. It may be argued that Mary is epis-
temically defective, in the sense that it might be difficult for Mary to 
know how to act. But her ignorance regarding the correct course of 
action does not preclude the possibility of there being objective moral 
values. Park writes,  
If Mary is interested in her future as a Christian, she can choose Christianity as 
her frame of reference. If she is interested in her future as an American, she may 
choose the American culture as her frame of reference. In short, our interest 
determines which culture we choose as a standard when we appraise a human 
conduct. (Park, 2011: 166) 
Suppose that in addition to being a Christian, Mary is a naturalized US 
citizen native of Moldova, a feminist, an anarchist, and a single mother 
who lives in New York City. Assuming that she is interested in her fu-
ture as an American, which aspect of her being an American is her guid-
ing force? Considering that the majority religion in the US is Christianity 
(70.6% according to Pew Research Center, 2019), wouldn’t Mary’s inter-
est in her future as an American involve being a good Christian? Recall 
our hypothetical killers’ culture. Such a culture deems that killing inno-
cent people is moral. Virtually all sensible people regard such an act as 
immoral. Is it true that our interest determines which culture is right? I 
think not. We can show, irrespective of our interests, and on the basis of 
sound logical reasoning, that the killers’ culture is objectively wrong. So, 
it is not true that our interest determines “which culture we choose as a 
standard when we appraise a human conduct.” We do not choose, for 
example, to refrain from torturing innocent babies for fun out of inter-
est. We choose not to do so because torturing innocent babies for fun is 
objectively immoral.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
If the arguments presented in this paper are sound, I have shown that 
Park’s rebuttal to the standard objections against cultural relativism fails. 
It fails because moral relativism is incoherent. Thus, it’s no wonder most 
moral philosophers do not regard moral relativism as a viable doctrine in 
ethics. 
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Notes 
 
1 There is a vast literature on moral relativism that meticulously exposes the flaws of 
moral relativism (See Kreeft 1999; Moser and Carson 2000; Garofalo 2013). Thus, 
this paper is not meant as another in-depth critique, but rather as a response to Park 
Seungbae’s particular rebuttal to criticisms of moral relativism. 
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